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I t	is	a	startling	fact	that,	in	Plato’s	corpus,	there	is	not	one	unam-biguous	instance	of	Socrates’	reforming	his	interlocutor’s	way	of	life	by	the	end	of	a	dialogue.	In	fact,	Socrates	seems	often	to	fail	
at	 improving	his	 interlocutors	at	all,	 let	alone	changing	 their	values.	
This	uninspiring	track	record	has	understandably	 led	many	scholars	
to	conclude	that	Socrates	is	a	failure.	Alexander	Nehamas,	e.g.,	writes	
that	 “Plato’s	 works	 do	 not	 at	 all	 show	 that	 Socrates’	 dialogue	 with	
his	fellows	has	…	beneficial	effects.”	He	then	asks	rhetorically,	“How	
could	 Socrates	 claim	 success	 for	 himself	 in	 light	 of	 such	 a	 record?”1 
John	Beversluis	is	more	emphatic:	“…	if	the	early	dialogues	show	any-
thing,	they	show	Socrates’	monumental	failure.”2	Some	scholars	con-
















3.	 I	 use	 the	 term	 ‘middle	 dialogues’	 out	 of	 convenience.	 Nothing	 in	 my	 argu-
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only	 to	 instrumental	 reason.	 The	 second	 stage	 still	 involves	 reason	
and	 argument,	 but	 their	 point	 here	 is	 not	 to	 convince	 the	 interlocu-
tor	of	anything:	 it	 is	 rather	 to	cause	 the	experience	of	philosophical	
pleasure,	an	experience	that	can	lead	to	his	valuing	wisdom	the	most.
Now,	 some	 scholars	 have	 recognized	 that,	 in	 the	 first	 place,	

















































Socrates	convinces	his	 interlocutor	of	 the	 instrumental	value	of	wis-
dom,	thus	motivating	him	to	do	philosophy	as	a	means	to	achieving	

















about	 or	 value	 (epimeleisthai)?	 He	 says	 that	 he	 wants	 them	 to	 care	
more	about	the best state of their souls. I	follow	many	interpreters	in	un-
derstanding	the	excellence	of	one’s	soul	to	be	the	condition	of	being	
wise	and,	further,	Socrates	to	want	his	interlocutors	not	to	begin	valu-
ing	wisdom	only	a	bit more	but	more than anything else.11	Additionally,	
Socrates	tries	to	cause	this	change	by	the	use	of	reason	and	arguments.	
10.	 Translations	of	Plato	are	from	John	M.	Cooper	and	D.	S.	Hutchinson,	ed.,	Pla-
to: Complete Works (Indianapolis:	Hackett,	1997),	with	occasional	revision.
11.	 In	fact,	in	the	Apology,	Socrates	lists	wisdom	(sophia, phronēsis),	truth,	the	best	
condition	of	one’s	soul,	excellence	(aretē),	and	the	city	itself	all	as	things	that	
he	wants	people	 to	care	about	more.	Scholars	 typically	consolidate	 the	 list	
by	understanding	the	relevant	excellence	to	be	the	excellence	of	one’s	soul,	
and	 that	 to	 consist	 in	 wisdom,	 that	 is,	 grasping	 the	 truth	 about	 “the	 most	












wisdom	 the most,	note	 that	Socrates	 identifies	wisdom	as	one	of	 “the	most	





















Socrates’	 conversion	 strategy	 is	 not	 only	 consistent	 with	 but	 deeply	
informed	by	Plato’s	moral	psychology.







ey,	 reputation,	 and	 honors	 as	 possible,	 while	 as	 for	 get-
ting	as	much	wisdom	and	truth	as	possible,	and	getting	
your	 soul	 into	 the	 best	 condition,	 that	 you	 do	 not	 care	




him	[ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω],	and	if	I	do	not	
think	he	has	attained	the	excellence	that	he	says	he	has,	I	
shall	reproach	him	because	he	attaches	little	importance	
to	the	most	 important	 things	and	greater	 importance	to	
inferior	 things.	 …	 For	 I	 go	 around	 doing	 nothing	 other	
than	persuading	both	young	and	old	among	you	not	 to	
care	 about	 [ἐπιμελεῖσθαι]	 your	 body	 or	 your	 wealth	 in	























ambiguous.	The	πάνυ μὲν οὖν may	indicate	less	of	a	wholehearted	agreement	
to	pursue	philosophy	and	more	of	an	ambivalence:	“a	witness	would	not	be	
able	to	determine	exactly	what	it	is	that	Clinias	is	affirming	and	how	far	his	
commitment	 goes”	 (97).	 Additionally,	 Socrates’	 first	 protreptic	 goes	 no	 fur-
ther	than	presenting	wisdom	as	of	the	highest	instrumental	value,	valuable	
for	the	sake	of	knowing	how	to	use	things	rightly,	and	thus,	even	if	Clinias’	































tative	methods,	see	the	collected	papers	in	G.	Scott,	ed.,	Does Socrates Have 







Nevertheless,	 I	 tend	to	consider	 it	as	 including	the	 following	 interlocutors:	
Euthyphro,	 Alcibiades,	 Clinias,	 Charmides,	 Critias,	 Laches,	 Nicias,	 Hippias,	
Ion,	Hippothales,	Lysis,	Euthydemus,	Dionysodorus,	Meno,	Protagoras,	Pha-
edrus,	Gorgias,	Polus,	Callicles,	and	Thrasymachus.	













The	 second	 argument,	 the	 Argument	 from	 Republic	 7,	 relies	 on	

























































every	reason	at	 this	point	 to	 think	 is	equally	plausible.	 I	shall	argue	
soon	 that	 we	 should	 favor	 it.	 For	 Plato	 does	 in	 fact	 regard	 Socrates’	
project	 as	 meant	 to	 happen	 in	 distinct	 stages	 over	 time,	 and	 the	
16.	 Cf.	G.	Scott	2000:	“Plato	does	not	seem	to	allow	the	possibility	of	a	sudden,	
complete	 ‘conversion’	 of	 human	 character”	 (167).	 That	 Plato	 thinks	 value	
transformation	 takes	significant	 time	 is	 supported	also	by	 the	seed-sowing	
metaphor	at	Phaedrus 276b–277a.	

























Now,	 it	 would	 be	 unpersuasive	 to	 argue	 that,	 because	 of	 Plato’s	








20.	On	the	phrase	‘taste	arguments’	(τῶν λόγων	…	γεύεσθαι),	cf.	Alc. 1 114a.	
of	game	of	 contradiction.	They	 imitate	 those	who’ve	 re-
futed	them	by	refuting	others	themselves	….	Then,	when	
they’ve	refuted	many	and	been	refuted	by	them	in	turn,	
they	 forcefully	 and	 quickly	 fall	 into	 disbelieving	 what	
they	believed	before	(539a–b).
Many	 scholars	 think	 that	 the	 criticism	 in	 this	 passage	 applies	 to	
Socrates.	It	is	not	difficult	to	see	why.	Socrates	routinely	exposes	young	
people	to	examination,	both	by	refuting	them	and	by	refuting	others	
























and	 wrong	 (100);	 and	 Nehamas	 1999:	 Socrates	 teaches	 argument	 “to	 very	
young	men”,	which	risks	producing	in	them	an	“agnosticism	or	even	cynicism”	
(60–61).










ward	by	Raphael	Woolf.	 I	 call	 it	 the	Argument	 from	  Erōs. Woolf	ob-
serves	that,	at	best,	Socratic	argument	can	only	ever	convince	a	person	
that	he	should	adopt	some	belief	because	the	reasons	support	doing	







Is	 it	 true	 that	Plato	 thinks	of	misdirected	erōs	 as	an	obstacle	 that	
Socrates	cannot	overcome?	He	certainly	thinks	of	it	as	an	obstacle.	As	
Woolf	notes,	Plato	has	Socrates	diagnose	Callicles’	erōs	as	the	reason	
why,	 despite	 being	 unable	 to	 refute	 Socrates’	 arguments,	 he	 refuses	
to	change	his	beliefs	(Grg. 513b–c).	This	passage	is	important,	as	it	is	
the	only	spot	 in	Plato’s	corpus	where	Socrates	diagnoses	 the	reason	
why	an	 interlocutor	has	 failed	 to	be	convinced	by	his	arguments	 in	







It	 is	 possible,	 of	 course,	 to	 regard	 Socrates’	 optimism	 here	 as	 na-









opposites.21	 Further,	 in	 places	 where	 an	 interlocutor’s	 definition	 im-





insistence	 that	 the	 fundamental	 claims	of	 conventional	morality	are	
true,	then,	is	precisely	the	sort	of	conversational	move	that	would	act	
as	a	suitable	precaution	against	moral	cynicism	arising	in	them.	More-
over,	 it	 makes	 sense	 that	 the	 recommended	 precaution	 in	 the	 pas-






115e,	 116c–d,	 133b,	 134a–135c;	 Euthyd.	 279b;	 Prot.	 332a–b,	 349e;	 Grg.	 493d,	
498c,	504d–e,	506e–507a,	507a–c,	527d;	Meno 73b–c, 87d–e,	98e;	Rep. 1.353e–
354a.	 Vice	 is	 bad:	 Alc. 1	 115d,	 135c;	 Euthyd. 281d–e;	 Prot. 332a–b;	 Grg. 469b,	
470e,	472d–473b,	477e,	479c,	498c,	505b,	507a–c,	521b,	522e;	Rep. 1.353e–354a.	
Virtue	and	vice	are	opposites:	Prot. 332d–e,	359e,	360d;	Grg. 507a–c.	
22. Charm. 160d,	161b,	175b,	176a;	Laches 192d,	193d;	Prot. 350b.	Cf.	H. Mi. 376b–c,	
where	Socrates	refuses	to	believe	that	the	one	who	voluntarily	acts	unjustly	
is	the	good	person,	despite	the	argument	seeming	to	show	that.	
23.	 See,	e.g.,	Lach. 180e–181a,	Alc. 1 124b,	Prot. 313c,	Lys. 205a,	and	Phdr. 269c–d.
24.	 In	fact,	he	is	extremely	careful	in	more	than	one	way.	He	also	refutes	those	
who	 target	people’s	 inherited,	 fundamental	moral	 convictions,	 such	as	Cal-
licles	and	Thrasymachus.	




For	 Socrates’	 purpose	 in	 the	 dialogue	 is	 explicitly	 to	 convert	 Alcibi-
ades	 to	 virtue	 and	 the	 cultivation	 of	 himself	 through	 philosophical	
conversation	(132b–133c,	134b–135e;	cf.	124b–c,	127e).	At	bottom,	then,	
Socrates’	 claim	 is	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 Alcibiades’	 case,	 a	 misplaced	 erot-









































There	 is	 a	 further	 reason	 for	 supposing	 that	 erōs is	 not	 an	 insur-
mountable	obstacle	for	Socrates.	It	concerns	the	timing	of	his	first	in-
teraction	with	Alcibiades.	In	the	Alcibiades,	Socrates	says	that,	though	
he	 has	 been	 observing	 Alcibiades	 for	 many	 years,	 he	 is	 deciding	 to	
talk	with	him	now	because	only	now	is	he	ready	to	listen	(Alc. 1	105e–
106a;	cf.	124c).	Remarkably,	what	has	made	Alcibiades	ready	to	listen	




listen	(νῦν γὰρ	…	μου ἀκούσαις,	106a).27 
Now,	 if	 misplaced	 erōs — i.e.,	 to	 go	 along	 with	 Woolf,	 erōs for	







26.	See	Ap. 37a–b,	Tht. 177a–b,	and	Symp. 221e–222a.	
27.	 It	is	disputed	whether	the	Alcibiades is	written	by	Plato,	though	scholars	are	
increasingly	 in	 favor	 of	 its	 authenticity.	 See	 Denyer	 2001:	 14–26	 and	 Jirsa	
2009	for,	to	my	mind,	convincing	rebuttals	to	authorial	skepticism,	and	Smith	
2004	for	an	opposing	view.	
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The	 second	 concerns	 a	 problem	 with	 trying	 to	 decide	 on	 the	 ba-
sis	of	reasons	what	to	value	the	most.	 In	book	9	of	the	Republic,	Pla-
to	 considers	 how,	 in	 general,	 we	 answer	 questions	 about	 value.	 He	
thinks	 that	 each	 of	 us	 uses	 a	 certain	 “criterion”	 (κριτήριον,	 582a)	 or	
“instrument”	 (ὄργανον,	 582d)	when	 judging	 things	 to	be	valuable	 (cf.	
ἐπῄνει	 …	 καὶ ἔψεγεν,	 582e).	 In	 particular,	 we	 use	 what	 we	 value	 the	
most,	and	we	judge	things	to	be	valuable	 in	 light	of	 it.	The	 lover	of	
profit	(ὁ φιλοκερδὴς),	e.g.,	makes	judgments	based	on	wealth	and	prof-
it	(πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει … ἐκρίνετο),	 i.e.,	he	judges	things	to	be	valuable,	
in	the	end,	insofar	as	they	promote	wealth.	So,	too,	with	the	lover	of	
honor	(ὁ φιλότιμός):	his	evaluative	judgments	are	based	on	honor	and	
victory	and	courage	(τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ).






















pleasure	 the	 most	 (Grg. 494a–b,	 511a,	 513c,	 521b);	 and	 with	 Thrasymachus,	
who	acts	in	the	same	manner	when	Socrates	argues	against	the	value	of	pow-
er	and	wealth	(Rep. 1.350d,	354a).	In	each	case,	what	seems	to	be	happening	
Suppose	 you	 want	 to	 convince	 a	 person	 that	 she	 should	 value	 x 
more	than	anything	that	she	currently	values.	One	natural	way	to	pro-





For	 two	reasons,	Plato	must	have	 thought	 that	a	direct	approach	
would	face	serious	problems	when	the	task	came	to	persuading	a	per-
son	to	change	what	he	values	the	most.	
The	 first	 concerns	 the	 drama	 of	 the	 Gorgias	 and	 Republic. When	
Socrates	 contests	 the	 ways	 of	 life	 of	 Polus,	 Callicles,	 and	 Thrasyma-
chus	—	when	he	provides	them	with	reasons	why,	roughly,	the	life	of	
philosophy	is	better	than	the	life	of	politics	—	he	meets	with	stubborn-
ness	 and	 defensiveness.	 None	 are	 persuaded.	 Importantly,	 these	 in-
terlocutors	are	among	Socrates’	most	 intransigent.	Equally	as	 impor-
tant,	 they	are	 the	only	 interlocutors	whose	conceptions	of	 the	good	
Socrates	attempts	to	change	directly.29	Most	often	he	aims	to	convince	
his	 interlocutors	 only	 that	 they	 are	 ignorant	 about	 virtue.	 However,	







ment	 concerns	 “the	 way	 we’re	 supposed	 to	 live”	 (Grg. 500c),	 and	 Socrates’	









virtuous	 is	 incompatible	 with	 acquiring	 the	 good	 as	 he	 sees	 it.	 But	 that	 is	
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a	perceptual	or	affective	experience.33	 I	shall	argue	that	this	 is	exact-
ly	what	Socrates	aims	 to	cause	 in	his	 interlocutors,	but	not	at	all	by	
means	 that	 we	 would	 regard	 as	 mystical	 or	 mysterious.	 He	 aims	 to	
cause	 it	—	or,	more	specifically,	 to	provide	 the	occasion	 for	 it	 to	hap-
pen	—	by	motivating	his	interlocutors	to	keep	doing	philosophy.	
In	the	next	section,	I	consider	how	doing	philosophy	could	cause	
such	 an	 experience.	 First,	 we	 need	 to	 inquire	 further	 into	 Socrates’	
typical	activities.	
If	the	above	argument	is	at	all	correct,	then	Socrates,	to	convert	his	






erly	 he	 will	 never	 be	 able	 to	 make	 a	 proper	 speech	 on	 any	 subject	
either”	(261a).	He	thus	presents	doing	philosophy	as	valuable	for	the	
sake	 of	 Phaedrus’	 acquiring	 rhetorical	 expertise.	 Socrates	 makes	 a	
similar	 move	 in	 the	 Alcibiades.	 He	 convinces	 Alcibiades	 that,	 unless	
he	gains	self-knowledge,	no	fame	or	influence	will	ever	come	to	him,	
thus	 motivating	 Alcibiades,	 like	 Phaedrus,	 to	 do	 philosophy	 for	 the	














What	 else	 can	 be	 done?	 What	 would	 it	 mean	 to	 experience	 a	
conversion	 here	—	here,	 where	 rational	 persuasion	 no	 longer	 seems	
viable?32	One	natural	answer	 is	 that	what	would	change	a	person	 is	
is	what	Republic 9	describes:	the	interlocutor	uses	what	he	values	the	most	
as	 his	 instrument	 of	 evaluative	 judgment,	 thus	 blocking	 off	 the	 possibility	
of	judging	something	on	the	basis	of	reasons	to	be	more	valuable	than	it	(cf.	





2004:	 23–26	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 Frankfurt	 1992:	 15–16.	 It	 is	 interesting	

































some	piece	of	reasoning	at	him”	 looks	 to	be	 futile,	since	such	reasoning,	 to	


































My	 account	 thus	 implies	 that	 Socrates	 does	 not	 always	 behave	 in	 the	 way	











losophy.	 I	mean	 for	 this	 to	cover	 typical	 cases	of	Socratic	 refutation.	
















34.	 One	might	suspect	 that	Protagoras	already	stands	 in	the	proper	relation	to	
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part,	 then	 something	 must	 explain	 it.	 What	 explains	 it,	 I	 argued,	 is	






40.	See,	e.g.,	Euthyphr. 15c,	Charm. 169d,	Laches 194a	and	201a,	Prot. 314b	and 361d,	

































that	 can	 be	 brought	 about	 only	 as	 “by-products	 of	 actions	 undertaken	 for	
other	ends”,	see	Elster	1983:	43–60.	
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This	 psychological	 tendency	 appears	 also	 in	 the	 Phaedo. Socrates	
claims	 that,	 when	 we	 experience	 “strong	 pleasure	 or	 pain”,	 we	 are	
“compelled	to	believe	[ἀναγκάζεται	…	ἡγεῖσθαι]	at	the	same	time	that	
what	causes	such	feelings	must	be	very	clear	[ἐναργέστατόν]	and	very	
true	 [ἀληθέστατον]”	 (Phd. 83c5–8).	 Now,	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 object	 is	
also	 good is	 not	 mentioned,	 but	 that	 is	 unsurprising:	 Socrates’	 point	
is	about	what	is	common	to	experiences	of	pleasure	and pain.	In	the	
case	 of	 pleasure,	 however,	 it	 is	 highly	 plausible	 that	 the	 experience	
would	instill	also	the	belief	that	the	object	causing	it	is	good.	Socrates’	
concern	in	the	context	is	with	the	beliefs	that	influence	our	habits	and	
ways	 of	 life	 (cf.	 ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος,	 83d8–9)	—	that	 is,	 with	
beliefs	about	the	good.	This	detail	clarifies	Socrates’	point	regarding	
of	 the	 practice,	 and	 they	 can	 be	 evaluated	 well	 only	 by	 people	 who	 have	
achieved	them	before.














too,	 with	 his	 confidence	 that	 further	 arguments	 will	 succeed	 at	 per-












the	philosopher]	has	the	most	pleasant	life	[ὁ βίος ἥδιστος]”	(583a1–3).41 
Plato	depicts	Apollodorus	testifying	to	this	fact	in	the	Symposium:	“my	
greatest	pleasure	comes	from	philosophical	conversations”	(173c).	
















What	 we	 wanted,	 though,	 was	 to	 know	 how	 doing	 philosophy	
could	cause	someone	to	value wisdom	the	most.	There	are	two	points	


































feel	pleasure	whenever	we	believe	 that	we	are	doing	well,	 and	 like-
wise,	whenever	we	feel	pleasure,	we	believe	 that	we	are	doing	well	



























that	you	know	 more about	what	 is	good	and	beneficial	 (thus	 the	choice	of	
the	pastry	baker,	who	is	responsible	for	causing	people	great	pleasure),	and	
what	explains	that	is	the	tendency,	when	something	causes	you	pleasure,	to	




















philosophy	 too soon,	 e.g.,	 before	 they	 experience	 the	 sort	 of	 philo-
sophical	pleasure	 that	 can	be	 transformative.	Socrates	 is	well	aware	
of	this	danger.	He	laments	in	the	Theaetetus that	“many	people”,	after	
receiving	 some	 initial	 benefit	 from	 his	 company,	 leave	 him	 “sooner	
than	they	should,	either	of	their	own	accord	or	through	the	harmful	
influence	 of	 others”	 (150e).	 However,	 this	 is	 precisely	 why	 Socrates’	














playing	 this	 role.	Here	we	might	hesitate.	Plato	 is	notoriously	 suspi-
cious	of	pleasure,	writing	that	the	true	philosopher	“keeps	away	from	
pleasures	…	as	far	as	he	can”	(Phd. 83b); that	pleasure	is	“evil’s	most	





is	 associated	 only	 ever	 with	 the	 merely	 apparent	 good:	 some	 genu-
inely	good	things	are	pleasurable,	and	the	best	life	for	humans,	Plato	
thinks,	will	involve	not	only	those	things	but	also	the	pleasure	of	them	
(Phil. 22a–b,	27d,	63d–64a).	More	 importantly,	Plato	 recognizes	 that	
pleasure	can	play	a	positive	role	in	convincing	someone	to	adopt	a	bet-
ter	way	of	life.	In	the	Laws,	he	writes	that	“nobody	would	willingly	be	
persuaded	to	do	[ἑκὼν ἐθέλοι πείθεσθαι πράττειν]	something	that	does	
not	cause	more	pleasure	than	pain”.48	He	then	recommends	that,	when	
trying	 “to	 persuade	 a	 man	 to	 live	 a	 just	 and	 pious	 life”,	 one	 should	
argue	that	it	is	more	pleasant	than	the	alternative	(663b).49	Thus,	Pla-
to	 considers	 it	 appropriate	 and	 strategic	 to	 exploit	 the	 motivational	
power	of	pleasure	when	trying	to	convert	a	person	to	a	new	way	of	life.	
On	 my	 view,	 though,	 Socrates	 is	 not	 trying	 to	 convince	 his	 inter-
locutors	that	the	life	of	philosophy	is	most	pleasurable.	He	is	trying	to	
48.	 See	Meyer	2015:	270–271	 for	discussion.	The	key	point	 is	 that	Plato	 is	not	
asserting	 psychological	 hedonism,	 but	 rather	 the	 weaker	 claim	 that	 a	 per-
son	will	not	willingly or	wholeheartedly (ἑκὼν ἐθέλοι)	be	persuaded	to	do	what	
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As	 a	 last	 note,	 it	 is	 worth	 considering	 why	 Plato	 would	 have	 de-










function	 (among	 other	 things)	 as	 recruitment	 tools.55	 To	 recruit	 stu-
dents,	though,	Plato	would	not	have	needed	to	convince	his	readers	

















students	or	associates?”	 (10).	Consider	also	Themistius’	 remark	at	Orations 
23.295	that	Axiothea	of	Phlius,	upon	reading	the	Republic,	came	to	study	with	
Plato,	and	likewise	with	the	Corinthian	farmer	and	the	Gorgias. 
















ness	 and	 stubbornness	 that	 is	 often	 caused	 by	 directly	 contesting	 a	
person’s	values.	His	strategy	is	best	understood	as	consisting	of	two	
stages.	 In	 the	 first,	 Socrates	 exploits	 his	 interlocutor’s	 concern	 with	
some	external,	non-philosophical	goal	(e.g.,	rhetorical	expertise,	pow-
er,	social	status)	to	motivate	him	to	take	up	philosophy	as	a	means	to	
it.	This	 is	 the	stage	 that	Plato	depicts	 in	many	dialogues.	 In	 the	sec-
ond,	this	instrumental	pursuit	is	meant	to	cause	a	transformation	after	
which	the	interlocutor	values	wisdom	the	most,	a	transformation	that	
51.	 See	 especially	 Ap. 24d–25c	 and	 Tht. 167e	 in	 Plato;	 and	 Mem. 1.2.22,	 Mem. 
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